This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the choice of green office space by commercial tenants. We analyze the decisions of more than 11,000 tenants to choose office space in green buildings or in otherwise comparable non-green buildings located nearby. We formulate six propositions to explain why specific firms and industries may be more likely to lease green space. We test these propositions using the tenants in a matched sample of more than 1,100 green office buildings and 3,900 nearby non-green buildings.
INTRODUCTION
The TNT Group, a global express delivery service headquartered in the Netherlands, recently announced that it would move its operations to three newlydeveloped green office buildings. The decision is rooted in the broader corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy adopted by the TNT Group. The firm's policy states that "it is our aim to invest in mitigating our impact on the environment." This is but one of a great many examples of conscious decisions by firms to choose "green" buildings. It suggests that real estate is a key element of the CSR and marketing policies of some companies. Similar considerations may influence strategic decision-making in many different kinds of firms.
Yet the use of green space by corporations and organizations has received scant attention in the fast growing management literature relating business organizations and the natural environment. In a recent and comprehensive survey of this literature, corporate housing decisions were not mentioned at all (Etzion, 2007) . But real estate decisions can form a large part of the environmental footprint of corporations. After all, buildings and their associated construction activity account for almost a third of world greenhouse gas emissions (Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, RICS, 2005) .
The behavior of corporate tenants can have important implications for the shift to a more sustainable built environment, as changes in demand force real estate suppliers to adapt rapidly to the environmental expectations of tenants. These expectations translate into financial incentives for the property investment industry, as the shifting preferences of tenants affect rental rates on commercial buildings and the volatility of flows of rental income arising from changes in occupancy. If tenants increasingly prefer to lease green space rather than conventional office space, then a differential in rental rates between green and conventional buildings is inevitable. Moreover, it is possible that the non-green commercial properties will depreciate faster, and occupancy rates might be lower.
In a recent paper (Eichholtz, et al, 2009 ), we analyzed the economic value of U.S.
office buildings certified with a green label, that is, buildings with an Energy Star or LEED certification. We found that these "green" buildings command a premium in rental rates and sales prices over conventional office buildings. Moreover, the analysis showed that occupancy rates are higher, and these rates are less volatile than rates in commercial office buildings without a green label. This suggests that there is an identifiable group of tenants willing to pay a premium to lease green space. This research also shows that part of the rental and value increment can be explained by climatic factors and the thermal attributes of green buildings, so immediate effects on firm profitability derived from lower utility costs are important. However, a part of the increment for a green building may not be explained by energy savings alone. Other factors are at work.
Clearly, some particular firms must have preferences for green office space.
Understanding the motivation for this choice of "sustainable" real estate may be important for two reasons. First, for the property sector to undertake the development of sustainable commercial real estate and for the investment community to finance these investments, it is important to identify the characteristics of potential tenants for this more expensive space. Second, a better understanding of those firms predisposed to seek "sustainable'" real estate may allow researchers, managers, and policy makers to determine the scope for voluntary measures, relative to regulation and command-andcontrol mechanisms, to promote green investments (Bansal and Roth, 2000) .
In this paper, we identify four factors influencing environmental decision-making with respect to corporate space-leasing decisions. First, occupancy of buildings with a green label can be economically profitable, as the operating costs of these buildings may be lower, and improved employee well-being may enhance productivity or reduce labor costs. Second, a green corporate headquarters and the use of green space in general may signal to stakeholders and customers that a firm has a long-run commitment to a CSR policy and is willing to pay for it. The occupancy of sustainable buildings can therefore have indirect economic effects through an improved reputation. For example, such a policy may attract and retain employees and customers. Third, by voluntarily accepting higher environmental standards now, firms can anticipate future legislation and avoid the risk of costly adjustment later. Fourth, although the attention of investors is focused understandably on firm profits, there is a distinct group of potential tenants for whom the non-financial utility from pursuing an active CSR policy exceeds the potential monetary costs of such a policy. This suggests that non-profit organizations and governments agencies may be actively engaged in CSR in advance of purely profit-maximizing firms.
In consideration of these factors, we postulate that firms in specific industries, for example, those in the space-intensive tertiary sector, or firms whose operations may be judged more costly to the environment, are more willing to lease green office space, even if this implies paying premium rents. We test these propositions exploiting a unique sample of office buildings with an Energy Star and/or LEED-rating, matched with a control sample of nearby office buildings without such ratings.
We collect data on the identity of tenants and the industry characteristics of tenants in these buildings and construct a control sample of other office buildings matched on geographical characteristics. Using data on more than 3,100 tenants in 1,180 green office buildings, and on a control sample of approximately 8,000 tenants in 4,000 conventional office buildings, we find that the mining and construction companies, as well as government and government-related organizations, are systematically more likely to lease green office space rather than conventional space when compared to corporate tenants in other industries. Furthermore, the analysis shows that a substantial number of firms in the oil and the financial services industry are among the largest occupiers of green office buildings. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize previous work on the environmental decisions of private firms, and we develop a theoretical framework to address why firms in some specific industries might choose to pay higher occupancy costs to "rent green." Section 3 provides an overview of the data, the methods, and some descriptive information. Section 4 presents results, and Section 5 is a brief conclusion.
CSR AND REAL PROPERTY
The mantra of "corporate social responsibility" is increasingly popular among business leaders, and it has become an important element in strategic decision-making. In addition, the business case for recognizing CSR is getting stronger; several empirical studies have concluded that companies that take CSR into account outperform other firms in financial terms.
1 The investment community has embraced the concept of socially responsible investments (SRI) with enthusiasm. For example, the number of SRI mutual funds has grown rapidly. SRI assets under management increased from $639 billion in 1995 to $2.71 trillion in 2007 (Social Investment Forum, 2007 In evaluating socially responsible investment decisions, investors focus on issues such as the impact of a firm's operations on the environment, the treatment of employees, and the social role of the firm in the broader society -often based on indices of CSR behavior (for example, the benchmarks produced by Kinder, Domini and Lydenberg, KLD, Innovest, or the Dow Jones Sustainability Index) which are now widely available.
External agents routinely screen firms on their corporate real estate and leasing decisions, as it is recognized more clearly that commercial real estate is of real consequence in matters of environmental sustainability.
Indeed, evidence shows that the property sector accounts for forty percent of U.S.
energy consumption and 38 percent of carbon dioxide emissions (U.S. Department of Energy, www.doe.gov). Awareness of these facts has lead to a range of different environmental rating systems for commercial properties, such as the Leadership in Energy and Environment Design (LEED) and Energy Star in the United States, BREEAM in the United Kingdom, and GreenStar in Australia. These environmental labels provide both landlords and tenants with a yardstick to measure the "greenness" of properties.
Incorporating sustainability in real estate investment decisions seems to pay off. Eichholtz, et al (2009) provide evidence that rents and transaction prices in green office buildings exceed those paid for conventional office buildings, while controlling for 2 See Renneboog et al (2008) , for an overview.
quality and location-specific characteristics. Effective rents are estimated to be about six percent above those of conventional office buildings and transaction prices are estimated to be 16 percent higher. Decomposition of this "green" premium provides more insight; the size of the premium in rents and selling prices depends on the extent to which buildings are energy efficient. However, energy efficiency alone does not completely explain the green increment commanded by labeled buildings.
The utility from leasing green space may differ across potential tenants; owners of firms may have a utility function that incorporates a set of corporate and societal values (Bollen, 2008) . If these values are important to the owners of firms, we can expect tenants to benefit from leasing space in green buildings, and, more importantly, to obtain economic and other advantages from actively pursuing an environmental policy. In the case of CSR, financial and non-financial motives are not mutually exclusive.
Adapting the framework of Bansal and Roth (2000) , we define four rationales that might induce social responsiveness in corporate real estate decision-making: direct economic benefits, indirect benefits, risk avoidance, and ethical motives. Based on these considerations, we develop propositions as to which industries may be most responsive to social responsibility in their decisions about real estate.
Corporate Responsibility in Real Estate

Direct economic benefits
CSR can have a direct effect on the economic profitability of firms. Under a traditional view, CSR poses an inherent conflict between maximizing financial value for shareholders and maximizing social welfare (Baumol, 1991; Friedman, 1970; Shleifer, 2004) . Indeed, there is room to question the validity of CSR as a value-enhancing concept (Devinney, 2009) . However, an increasing number of studies suggest that incorporating social responsibility in the strategy of the firm does not reduce -and may even enhancethe value of the firm, for example, through lower operating costs and increased efficiency (Guenster et al, 2009; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) . Indeed, for commercial buildings, energy -an important element of sustainability -represents a substantial cost of building operations. Energy costs are nearly ten percent of rents. These costs can be decreased through energy efficiency measures that are often integral to green building design.
Anecdotal evidence shows that green buildings, on average, use thirty percent less energy than conventional buildings (Kats, 2003) . Thus, leasing space in more energy efficient buildings can have a direct impact on occupancy costs.
Another potential benefit of occupancy in a green building is an increase in employee productivity. Several studies report a positive correlation between a building's internal environment (e.g. its indoor air quality) and employee health and productivity.
The potential gains of reduced sick leave and productivity gains are substantial, and it has been asserted that these benefits exceed costs by a wide margin (Apte, Fisk, and Daisey, 2000; Fisk and Rosenfeld, 1997) . The enhanced indoor air quality arising from an improved building structure, and from better heating, cooling and ventilation systems is most beneficial for space-intensive firms, especially those with operations primarily located in office buildings, and for firms largely dependent on human capital, such as firms in the tertiary sector.
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Indirect economic benefits
Economic opportunities following from the relocation of corporate activities in green buildings could also arise indirectly. These ancillary -often hard to measurebenefits may stem from an improved corporate reputation. Fombrun (1996) argues that a firm's reputation is derived from its credibility, trustworthiness, reliability and responsibility. Responsibility in itself is a function of environmental, financial and social behavior (Miles and Covin, 2000) . A continuum in the adaptation of environmental and social behavior ranges from simply complying with legislation to incorporating CSR proactively in daily operations. Leasing space in a green building may reify the environmental and social awareness of a firm and may signal the superior social responsibility of the tenants who locate there. In the end, the implementation of CSR policies rather than the simple policy commitment is necessary to reap the business benefits of CSR (Ramus and Montiel, 2005) .
Some have argued that the position of a firm in the CSR continuum is not conditioned externally by society (Devinney, 2009 ). Nevertheless there is ample evidence that stakeholder pressure can affect corporate decision-making. Firms pay more attention to the larger and more powerful corporate stakeholders: investors, customers, and employees (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997) .
Awareness is increasing among investors of the financial impact of inadequate environmental management, and some segments of the investment community avoid investing in corporations that cause social injury or environmental damage (Spicer, 1978) . For example, it has been reported recently that institutional investors (such as pension funds, university endowments, banks and insurance companies) are systematically underinvested in so-called "sin" stocks (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2007 If leasing green office space leads to a superior reputation, this may enable firms to attract investors more easily and at better market rates (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) .
Some empirical studies have argued that companies with highly developed environmental and social engagement are able to obtain better credit ratings, thereby lowering the cost of debt (Bassen, Meyer, and Schlange, 2006) and lowering the implied cost of equity (Derwall, 2007) . Companies that frequently rely on the public capital market will profit from a lower cost of debt or equity.
Second, it is asserted that "customers drive corporations green" (Vandermerwe and Oliff, 1990) . Firms operating in competitive markets are exhorted by customers to incorporate environmental responsiveness in manufacturing, research, and marketing.
These consumers can now screen firms on their social and environmental engagement.
This can pay off. A superior reputation -for example through ethical behavior -may appeal to certain segments of customers (Auger et al, 2003) . This may enable firms to increase sales or to charge premium prices (Creyer and Ross, 1997; Klein and Leffler, 1981) . The importance of reputation among customers depends on the domain in which a firm operates and the degree to which it interacts directly with retail customers.
Reputation effects are important for the largest and most visible firms in an industry, as these companies, like McDonalds, Starbucks, and Wal-Mart, are usually under the direct scrutiny of end-consumers and the media (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) . The availability of information from investment analysts and arbiters of CSR performance might benefit large firms disproportionally, but this simultaneously increases stakeholder pressure to engage actively in sustainable investments.
Alternatively, for those involved in risky technologies (e.g., nuclear or biotechnology), in national and international public policy debates (e.g., those active in certain oppressive societies), or those operating in controversial product-markets (e.g., tobacco or weapons), having a CSR policy may simply be a way to alter a negative image or to offset a bad reputation (Chen, Patten, and Roberts, 2008) . However, Strahilevitz (2003) argues that CSR activities generally do not enhance the reputation of firms that are perceived to be unethical. This dictum applies especially for firms supporting causes that are related to their own business, e.g. a tobacco company supporting a cancer foundation, which may simply increase the perceptions of self-serving behavior. (Forehand and Grier, 2003) . But leasing green space is neutral in that regard. Thus, corporate rental policy could potentially help in offsetting a negative corporate image or in improving the reputation of firms in objectionable industries.
Third, a superior reputation may enable firms to attract and retain a better workforce (Turban and Greening, 1997) . Indeed, Koh and Boo (2004) show that there is some evidence of a relation between the social activities of companies and employee satisfaction. Increasingly, human capital is viewed as a key source of value creation in modern firms (Zingales, 2000) ; the attraction and retention of employees is especially important in economies and industries where skilled employees are scarce and skills are inelastically supplied. A recent paper by Edmans (2007) shows that employee satisfaction is positively related to financial performance; employee satisfaction is affected by pecuniary benefits, but also by the quality of working conditions.
Risk avoidance
Governmental legislation greatly affects the social responsiveness of firms. This is straightforward; failure to comply with legislation may be costly. A large number of U.S. companies are sued each year for some alleged violation of environmental laws; the likelihood of becoming target of environmental litigation is strongly dependent on the industry type and the location of operations. For example, firms in environmentally sensitive industries are more exposed to media visibility, which shapes the public's view of firm activities (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990 ).
The litigation costs can be direct, through administrative and civil penalties, or indirect, through negative market responses following public announcement of an environmental lawsuit (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002) . Especially in hazardous and resource-intensive industries, it may be likely that the monetary gains from going beyond minimal compliance with rules and regulations will largely offset the initial investment.
Although the real estate sector can hardly be classified as a particularly hazardous industry, corporate tenants might still be vulnerable to costly litigation related to the labor environment (e.g., asbestos, formaldehyde). Leasing sustainable office space may certainly decrease the risk of future employee litigation, by providing high indoor air quality standards and by demonstrating the firm's commitment to its workforce. 
Ethical behavior
"Corporate social engagement" originally referred to the ethical motives of firms rather than financial gains (Bowen, 1953) , but for political and economic reasons the focus of social engagement is often directed towards the economic advantages of incorporating CSR in strategic decision-making. However, the first-movers and earlyadopters of social and environmental innovations are often those parties for whom monetary gains are of secondary importance. Federal and local governments and nonprofit organizations are eager to demonstrate their environmental engagement through leasing space in green buildings, just because this is "the right thing to do" (Wood, 1991) .
Moreover, these governmental and non-profit organizations are subject to less market discipline. With a soft budget constraint, any premium for renting green space may be less onerous.
Propositions
The four factors relating real estate decision-making to CSR imply different weights for firms in different industries. By exploring the varying degrees to which firms from different industries rent green offices, we can investigate the motivations for doing so. Based on this idea, we formulate six propositions, which will be analyzed and tested by relying upon detailed information on individual corporate tenants for a large sample of commercial office buildings in the U.S. 
Analysis
We analyze the phenomenon of green buildings in the commercial office sector in four distinct but related ways. We relate each of these analyses to the theoretical framework and propositions developed in this section. First, we report those entities which consume the largest amount of green office space, and we report the industries To account for differences in office space utilization among industries, column (4) shows the total square footage of office space occupied by the largest green tenants and column (5) presents the green office stock rented by each tenant, relative to the total office stock it occupies (as reported in CoStar). Several trends are apparent. First, the California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) is not only among the top-twenty occupants of green office space, but all of its office stock has a green label. Indeed, the agency boasts that its headquarters building in Sacramento, California is equipped with state-of-the-art techniques to improve indoor air quality and to reduce energy use and that it is among the world's most energy and resource-efficient buildings. They note that the building "gives a physical presence to the reality of an agency whose single task is to guard the great environment." This is a clear example of how non-profit or governmental organizations derive non-financial utility from leasing green, and can lead the way in sustainable property investments, supporting Proposition V. As mentioned on the Cal/EPA website, "this approach not only makes environmental sense, but it also makes the building a better place to visit and in which to work." This motivation is clearly in line with Proposition IV.
Some of the commercial banks are not only prominent tenants of green space in absolute terms, but also relative to their total office stock. For example, ABN-AMRO and Wells Fargo lease substantial proportions of their total office needs -58 percent and 37 percent, respectively -in green buildings. For the former, the headquarters in Chicago provide the main explanation: the 1.3 million square foot office building, which makes up most of the office stock leased by ABN-AMRO, was awarded a "LEED for new construction" label at the gold level in 2007. Wells Fargo occupies several buildings with a green label. In fact, sustainability is a major strategic issue, and the bank has a wellarticulated sustainability policy. In interviews conducted by telephone with the authors, a representative explained that "...it is important to show our environmental focus, for example, by leasing green office space." As argued by Ramus and Montiel (2005) , it is the implementation of CSR policies rather than the policy commitment that is necessary to reap direct business benefits. This is in line with reputation Proposition II, as leasing space in a green building may send a signal of social awareness to stakeholders.
For other corporations, such as Adobe Systems, Compuware Corp., or The
Vanguard Group, leasing green space may not be a deliberate act, but it may merely come with a preference for high quality office space, in combination with a growing need for space due to rapid expansion. Indeed, it has been shown that green buildings are in general newer, have a higher quality rating, and have more amenities in comparison to conventional office buildings (Eichholtz, et al, 2009 ). Alternatively, the location of firm activities in green buildings may attract and retain highly qualified employees.
Finally, it is worth noting that the twenty tenants documented in Table 1 occupy almost one sixth of the total inventory of green office space in the United States. As reported in Appendix table A1, forty tenants in the US consume almost thirty percent of the entire stock of green office space in the country.
-Insert Table 1 about here - Table 2 reports the aggregate amount of green office space occupied by the largest four-digit SIC codes, in absolute terms as well as relative to the total office stock occupied by the SIC code. Column (1) shows the twenty industry categories with the highest aggregate of total green office space. Legal services -which includes attorneys and their support staffs -is by far the largest occupant of green office space. This contrasts with the results reported in Table 1 , where only a single tenant from the legal services industry was among the top twenty. Although individual tenants from the legal services industry are not major occupiers of green space, the sector as a whole has a clear preference for sustainable office buildings. This reflects the fact that firms in the legal services industry are relatively small, so their choices are not clearly visible at the level of the individual firm when ranked by absolute total green space consumption. The result is in line with Propositions I and IV, wherein we argue that tenants in the tertiary sector are more likely to lease space in green buildings, as the direct benefits of leasing green space affect these tenants most. A superior indoor environment is attractive to the human capital employed.
Other industry categories that are among the largest tenants of green space are Public Administration, National Commercial Banks, Crude Petroleum and Gas, and Investment Advisors. This is generally in line with the evidence in Table 1, and supports Propositions I and III.
In Column (5), where we document the incidence of green space as a percentage of total office space occupied by the sector (as reported in CoStar), we observe that 63 percent of the total office stock occupied by the Crude Petroleum and Gas industry is leased in office buildings with a green label. This fraction is far higher than it is for other industries, and supports our Proposition III; firms in environmentally sensitive industries have a higher likelihood of leasing green. For example, Chevron Corp. has recently occupied a newly developed building in Louisiana, which has been awarded a LEED Gold certification. Leasing green space "supports the company's long-standing commitment to the Gulf Coast and the state of Louisiana. The building is located in a park-like setting, and the three hundred thousand square foot office building provides a safe, healthy and productive workplace for up to 750 people." 6 Although this expression of social and environmental awareness is unrelated to the core business of Chevron, it might help to improve its reputation among stakeholders.
-Insert Table 2 about here -
Control Sample
Industry observers note that the three most important attributes of real estate are "location, location, and location." We take this maxim seriously by matching each green building to a set of commercial office buildings which are in close proximity. In this way, we identify clusters of nearby buildings. Each cluster contains one green office building and all other office buildings within a 0.25 mile radius. This match, which relies upon the latitude and longitude recorded for each green building, yielded 1,180 clusters, each containing one green building and an average of three nearby control buildings. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Tenant Concentration in Green Versus Non-Green Buildings
In Section 2 we hypothesize that specific industries may have a higher likelihood of leasing green office space, for example governmental and non-profit organizations -to maximize non-financial utility -or the oil industry -to offset negative reputation effects from environmentally sensitive operations. To investigate this, we first calculate the fraction of leased office space per building for each tenant. Then, we aggregate these fractions based on one-digit SIC codes for each green building and each control building. 7 For each building, this yields the distribution of office space by major industrial category, matched with the characteristics of that building -such as building age, size, and quality, and the presence of an Energy Star and/or LEED certification.
We first investigate differences in tenant composition in green versus conventional office buildings. For instance, if green buildings serve as a "flag" for corporations, these buildings may be more likely to be owner-occupied or to have a more concentrated tenant base. We calculate Herfindahl indices of tenant concentration for each green building and its corresponding set of control buildings.
(1)
where H n is the Herfindahl index for building n, O in is the total square footage occupied by tenant i as a percentage of the total occupied office space in building n. Figure 3A reports the difference in Herfindahl indices for each green building and its corresponding control buildings. The differences are evenly distributed, with a fat tail on the left. This implies that there is a less concentrated tenant base, in terms of industrial category, in green buildings. However, this raw comparison does not control for differences in building quality or other unobserved characteristics. This may be important, as green buildings are found to be larger than conventional office buildings (Eichholtz, et al, 2009 ). This could well lead to a more dispersed tenant base. Figures 3B and 3C report the difference in Herfindahl indices based on the number of industries and 7 We use one-digit SIC code aggregates rather than two-, three-, or four-digit SIC codes, as these would not yield a reasonable number of observations per industry. Following the standard industry classification structure, we group industries in 1) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 2) Mining and Construction, 3) Manufacturing, 4) Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services, 5) Wholesale and Retail Trade, 6) Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, 7) Services and 8) Public Administration.
the difference in the fraction of office space occupied by the largest tenant, respectively. Figure 3B shows that in both green and control buildings, there tends to be a clustering of tenants that are in the same industry, as indicated by the large number of zero observations. Figure 3C shows that the fraction of space occupied by the largest tenant does not substantially differ between green buildings at the set of control buildings.
-Insert Figure 3 about hereThese first comparisons do not indicate that green buildings are more frequently occupied by one major tenant. However, these comparisons do not control at all for building and location quality. To control specifically for quality and locational effects, we estimate the following equation:
where the dependent variable is the difference between the Herfindahl index in green building g versus control building c in a cluster n. We estimate Equation (2) These location coefficients account for the unobserved characteristics related to each specific location. We include one dummy for each of the N distinct 0.2 square mile clusters. !, " n , and # n are estimated coefficients and $ n is an error term. Results are presented in Table 3 for ordinary least squares regression models corrected for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) .
Column (1) (3) indicate that the tenant base is more diverse in green buildings, with the Herfindahl index of industry concentration on average 14 percentage points lower than in otherwise comparable regular office buildings.
-Insert Table 3 about here -
The likelihood of leasing green
To investigate the extent to which firms in specific industries are more likely to lease green space rather than conventional office space, we analyze the fraction of office space occupied by a single-digit SIC code in a green building and the fraction occupied by the same industry in the otherwise comparable control building. This analysis indicates the likelihood of leasing green space for a specific industry. We estimate the following equation for each one-digit SIC code:
where the dependent variable is the total square footage O in occupied by tenants in building i in cluster n as a fraction of total occupied office space in the building. X i is a vector of hedonic characteristics of building i -building age, building size and building quality and c n is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a building is located in cluster n and zero otherwise. These location coefficients allow for differences in tenant concentration at each location, and they account for unobserved characteristics related to each specific location. g i is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if building i is rated by Energy Star or LEED and zero otherwise. !, " i , # n , and ! " are estimated coefficients and $ in is an error term. Table 4 presents estimates of Equation (3), with each column corresponding to a specific industry group. The dependent variable represents the fraction of office space occupied by tenants in the corresponding industry group. Because the dependent variable has a large number of zeros (i.e., an industrial category rents no space in a particular building), we estimate equation (3) as a Tobit model. In any case, the estimated coefficients indicate the propensities of different industries to locate in various kinds of buildings. Note the propensity of firms in the transport, communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services sectors to choose larger and higher quality buildings (Column 2), and the propensity of firms in the retail and wholesale trade industries to chose lower quality office space (Column 3). In contrast, public tenants are more likely to choose higher quality space.
Column (1) reports the results for the manufacturing industry, which includes everything ranging from apparel producers to car manufacturers. Office utilization is expected to be rather limited for these sectors. Indeed, the main explanatory variables are inconclusive, and the indicator variable for a green building has no significant effect. The same holds for the transportation and communications industry, as documented in column (2). Office space leased by retail and wholesale trade is mainly in small buildings relatively lower quality. As green certification is more prevalent in new and large buildings, the negative coefficient for the indicator variable for green buildings is in line with expectations.
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Columns (4) and (5) report results for the finance, insurance and real estate industry, and the services industry, respectively. Especially for these industries, which include legal services and commercial banking, one would expect that leasing space in green office buildings is rational, as energy efficiency (Proposition I) and perceptions about indoor air quality (Propositions I and IV) are of major importance. However, in contrast to expectations, the results indicate a negative coefficient on the green variable for both estimations. So, although descriptive evidence in the previous section indicated that some firms in the finance and services industry are among the larger tenants of green space, a more pervasive trend towards leasing green cannot be documented in these industries when controlling appropriately for building and location quality. This suggests that it is rather the larger and most visible firms that move first in the implementation of social and environmental measures, only followed later by the critical mass in the same industry (Proposition II).
Finally, in line with Proposition V, tenants in public administration seem to have a preference for green office space, indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for the green dummy as documented in Column (6). These results show the increased occupancy of green space by government-related tenants relative to otherwise comparable regular office space, while controlling for quality and locational characteristics.
-Insert Table 4 about hereTo investigate further the likelihood that certain industries will lease green space rather than conventional office space, we compare the fraction of office space occupied by a specific industry in a green building with the fraction occupied by the same industry in each control building in the same cluster. In this more refined model, we also include summary measures of variations in the average characteristics of each one-digit industry code by metropolitan area. We estimate the following equation for each one-digit SIC code:
where the dependent variable is the difference between the fraction of square footage occupied by tenants in green building g in cluster n and the fraction of square footage occupied by tenants in control building c -where c is located in the same cluster. (X gn -X cn ) is a vector of the hedonic characteristics of the green building -building age, building size and building quality -in cluster n, minus the corresponding quality characteristics in the control building. c n is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if building n is located in cluster n and zero otherwise. These location coefficients can individually affect the percentage of square feet occupied and account for unobserved characteristics related to the specific location. To control further for differences in the average characteristics of industries across metropolitan areas, we include a vector Y n of variables measuring average employee output, payroll per employee, the number of employees per establishment, and the number of establishments. These data were computed for each one-digit SIC code by MSA. 9 !, " n , # n and ! " n are estimated coefficients and $ n is an error term.
Results are presented in Table 5 for ordinary least squares regression models corrected for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) . Each column corresponds to a specific one-digit SIC code. Holding other factors in the regression constant, the intercept indicates whether the fraction of office space occupied by tenants in a specific industry is larger (or smaller) in green office buildings as compared to regular office buildings. For most industries, the constant is significantly negative, which indicates that tenants are more likely to lease space in conventional office buildings rather than in environmentally-labeled buildings. This is consistent with the small fraction of the total office stock that has a certified label.
Exceptions to the pattern of significantly negative coefficients are the 'Mining and Construction' and 'Public Administration' industries. The former has a significantly positive constant, which indicates that tenants in this industry group, on average, lease more office space in green buildings than in non-green office buildings, controlling for differences in building quality. This finding is in line with Proposition III, which states that "...firms with environmentally sensitive operations will be more likely to lease green office space, as this can help to offset otherwise more negative corporate images." As documented in Table 2 , companies in the mining and construction industry have a large fraction of office inventory in green buildings, which is confirmed by the results in Column (2) of Table 5 . We find an insignificant difference in space occupied in green buildings as compared to regular buildings for the Public Administration sector. This means that, relative to conventional office buildings in the same geographical area, the government and government-related tenants do not occupy significantly more space in green office buildings.
The variables measuring the concentration of establishments and labor productivity are generally statistically significant, suggesting that there are variations in the propensity to "lease green" by SIC across metropolitan areas -arising from variations in industry characteristics across metropolitan areas.
We measure the clustering of certain industries by including a variable on the number of establishments for a specific industry in a metropolitan area. The coefficient is negative for the finance, insurance, real estate and services industry. This implies that in areas with a higher office space density, the likelihood of leasing green office space rather than conventional office space is smaller. These locations are likely to be in, or very close to, the Central Business District, usually the location having the best locational quality. This result confirms previous research, e.g., Eichholtz, et al, (2009) For the variable measuring the payroll per employee -which is a proxy for the quality of human capital -the coefficient is almost consistently positive. Recall that this variable varies for each industry group by metropolitan area. This implies that tenants who are more dependent on high levels of human capital are more likely to rent office space in green buildings, confirming Proposition IV. Moreover, the significantly positive coefficient on the variable measuring sales per employee indicates that in areas with higher employee productivity -or more value-added per employee -tenants across all industries are more likely to lease green rather than conventional office space.
More productive companies employing more human capital are more likely to rent space in these same buildings.
-Insert Table 5 about here -
CONCLUSIONS
Awareness is growing that the built environment is important as a source of greenhouse emissions and as a major consumer of energy and raw materials. Firms more conscious of corporate social responsibility may therefore include real estate in their strategic decision-making by leasing environmentally-labeled office space.
Prior evidence has shown that some corporate tenants are not only willing to lease space in green office buildings, but that these tenants pay a rental premium as well. We identify four determinants of the penetration of CSR in real estate decision-making. From these, we develop six propositions about which firms or industries are willing to rent green space and to pay the rental premium. By building a comprehensive description of the tenants in U.S. office buildings with a green label -awarded by Energy Star or the USGBC -we address these propositions.
The descriptive results show that the oil industry is a major consumer of green office space, which follows from a general proposition that firms in environmentally sensitive industries will actively incorporate sustainability in strategic decisions such as headquarters selection (perhaps merely to enhance reputation). Firms in the legal and financial services industry lease a substantial share of green office space as well. For some of these firms, further investigation shows support for our proposition that firms in the tertiary sector acknowledge the productivity benefits of green buildings. However, it is likely that for other firms, leasing green is a result of the preference for high quality buildings, rather than a conscious act of "responsible behavior," since green buildings are usually higher-quality buildings.
We then address tenant composition in green buildings as compared to a matched set of conventional office buildings. We find that, controlling for differences in quality and unobserved locational characteristics, tenants are more concentrated in green buildings, occupying larger shares of the buildings. This may indicate the desire to use a building as a flag to signal commitment to CSR.
In general, the descriptive evidence confirms our propositions, to the extent that the expected industries each have a few "green" leaders. However, the results of the regression and Tobit-analyses are less clear: a statistically significant commitment to green space usage currently only exists for the manufacturing and mining industry and for public administration, respectively. These findings confirm the proposition that companies with socially challenging operations may use green buildings to offset negative reputation effects. Moreover, the government and government-related organizations, for which non-financial utility is of major importance, are substantially more likely to rent green office space than are other sectors. The most prominent example is California's Environmental Protection Agency, with all of its activities located in a highly sophisticated environmental-friendly office building.
It also turns out that the concentration and size of establishments, as well as the extent to which human capital is available in certain metropolitan areas, has a distinct positive influence on the fraction of environmentally-labeled space that is leased by particular industries.
For developers and investors, this has important implications. The higher initial outlay that may be needed for a newly developed sustainable office building, or for the refurbishment of an existing office building, can be recouped through energy savings and lower risk premiums, or through higher net rents. Currently, industry leaders and nonprofit organizations (i.e. government) seem to be most willing to pay this rental premium.
However, for the critical mass to engage in renting green, more insight in direct and indirect benefits of such a strategy is needed first. This paper provides only the first step in that. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the difference in tenant concentration -as measured by the Herfindahl index -in a green building and each of the corresponding control buildings.
The dependent variable in Column (2) is the difference in the fraction of space occupied by the largest tenant in a green building and each of the corresponding control buildings.
The dependent variable in Column (3) is the difference in industry concentration among tenantsas measured by the Herfindahl index -in a green building and each of the corresponding control buildings.
Each regression also includes 1,180 dummy variables, one for each district cluster.
Standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
